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Abstract: 
Laws that prohibit denial – or, the other way around – acknowledgment of gross human rights 
violations are, to some, important means of consolidating ‘truth-telling’, making sure certain 
facts cannot be contested anymore. To others, they are attempts by the state to fix an official 
truth while outlawing other versions of history, thus consolidating the state’s power. Such 
‘memory laws’ may play a role in determining the width of the public sphere within which the 
memory of such conflicts is discussed. As they deal with the legacy of gross human rights 
violations, they can also be regarded as transitional justice mechanisms. A pertinent question 
is whether memory laws actually ‘succeed’ in shrinking this space for contestation. In order to 
provide a starting point for this discussion, this chapter provides a critical consideration of the 
motives states may have for prohibiting denial or acknowledgment of gross human rights 
violations (as illustrated by the European Court of Human Rights judgments in Perinçek v. 
Switzerland), in order to consider the implications such laws may have for the public sphere 
in which truth and memory of past conflicts are debated. It shows how all of the reasons that 
state authorities may have for adopting memory laws engender their own problems; the 
tentative conclusion is that the potential of memory laws to police the public sphere after mass 





In 2014, in the context of the Ukraine conflict that was stirring up all kinds of memories and 
sensitivities related to the region’s past, the Russian president Putin signed a law to 
criminalize expressions that distort the Soviet Union’s role in World War II, as well as denial 
of Nazi crimes.1 Meanwhile, France is still in the middle of a debate on the prohibition of 
                                               
1 Reuters.com, 5 May 2014. 
denying the Armenian genocide – whereas in Turkey persons have been jailed for 
acknowledging that event.  
Laws that prohibit denial – or, the other way around, acknowledgment –  of gross 
human rights violations are, to some, important means of consolidating the ‘truth’ about such 
atrocities, making sure certain facts can no longer be publicly contested. To others, they are 
attempts by the state to fix an official truth while outlawing other versions of history, thus 
consolidating the state’s power in determining what should be regarded as ‘truth’. Such laws – 
which I term ‘memory laws’ – may thus play a role in determining the width of the public 
sphere within which the memory of such conflicts is discussed. As they deal with the legacy 
of gross human rights violations, they can also be regarded as transitional justice mechanisms. 
A pertinent question is whether memory laws actually ‘succeed’ in shrinking this 
public space for contestation – to answer this, more empirical research is needed. For now, let 
us start by critically considering the motives states may have to prohibit such speech in the 
aftermath of gross human rights violations. These motives are aptly illustrated in the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case of Perinçek v. Switzerland2 – where a 
politician’s conviction for denying the Armenian genocide was judged a violation of freedom 
of expression.  
This case makes clear that memory laws bring up several pressing questions: how to 
determine which groups shall be protected, and over how many generations. Is it even 
possible to set limits to the public sphere after a certain lapse of time? Which mass atrocities – 
and what kinds of expressions about those atrocities – should be put beyond contestation? Is it 
possible to adopt memory laws while protecting the public sphere of contestation over the 
past from becoming so restricted that ‘coming to terms with the past’ implies repressive 
practices? This contribution analyses the motives for prohibiting denial or acknowledgment of 
gross human rights violations, as illustrated by the Perinçek case, in order to consider the 
implications such laws may have for the public sphere in which truth and memory of past 
conflicts are debated. 
 
 
Memory laws  
 
                                               
2 ECtHR Perinçek v Switzerland, 17 December 2013 ; ECtHR Perinçek v Switzerland (Grand Chamber) 15 October 2015, 
appl.no. 27510/08. 
I define ‘memory laws’ as (criminal, civil or administrative) laws that implicitly or explicitly 
prohibit or restrain expressions about gross human rights violations in the past. They may be 
targeted at denial or at acknowledgment of what happened. Laws can be explicitly tied to a 
situation (such as criminalization of ‘Holocaust denial’) or can be formulated in a more 
general manner (such as ‘incitement to hatred’ legislation that several states interpret as 
including genocide denial3).  
Most research in this field has focused on denial: particularly Holocaust denial. 
Whereas negationists deny that mass human rights violations happened at all, revisionists 
contest conventional views about the interpretation of, and responsibility, for such crimes, 
which is thus more difficult to separate from historiography.4 Besides negation, laws 
sometimes also extend to minimization, justification or glorification of gross human rights 
violations – which may include atrocities in the present and future.  
Cohen has identified different forms of denial: literal denial of the facts, interpretive 
denial (giving the facts a different meaning; euphemisms, blaming the other party, isolating 
the facts as incidents, etc.), and implicatory denial (denying the moral or political implications 
of the facts, including appeals to higher loyalties and advantageous comparisons).5 Hennebel 
and Hochmann point to the distinction that is made in German scholarship between 'bare 
denial' and 'aggravated denial'; the latter explicitly targets a group of people (e.g. by accusing 
them of lying).6  
In his research on the idea-vocabulary of genocide denials, Charny has identified 
various methods commonly used by deniers of known genocides, which include, amongst 
other things, denying the facts of the genocide by transforming them into other kinds of 
events (such as security measures or military operations); depicting the perpetrators as victims 
and charging the victims with being perpetrators; insisting that the full data are not available 
(for example, denying the authenticity of documents, claiming that not-yet-opened archives 
will show a different picture); and relativism that mitigates the horror of events (for example 
by comparing them to natural disasters).7  
                                               
3 This is also required for EU Member States: see the Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on 
combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law, [2008] OJ L 328/55. 
4 E Fronza, ‘The punishment of negationism: the difficult dialogue between law and memory’, (2006) Vermont law review , 
609, 614. 
5 S Cohen, States of denial: knowing about atrocities and suffering, (Cambridge, Polity, 2001). 
6 L Hennebel and T Hochmann, ‘Introduction. Questioning the criminalization of denials’ in L Hennebel and T Hochmann 
(eds), Genocide denials and the law (New York, Oxford University Press, 2011). On bare denial and hate speech, see also 
RA Khan, ‘Holocaust denial and hate speech’ in L Hennebel and T Hochmann (eds), Genocide denials and the law (New 
York, Oxford University Press, 2011) 77. 
7 IW Charny, ‘The psychology of denial of known genocides’ in IW Charny (ed), Genocide: A Critical Bibliographic 
Review. Volume 2 (London, Mansell Publishing and New York, Facts on File, 1991) 3,14-15. 
Such strategies may also appear simultaneously within one piece of ‘research’, 
whereas authors have been known to progress from literal denial (by which they soon make a 
mockery of themselves) towards more sophisticated forms.8 Charny mentions as a separate 
form of genocide denial the classification of activities in other categories than genocide, 
mostly as wars; such arguments sometimes go together with justifications – for example 
explaining the events as self-defense against rebellion.9  
 
 
Memory laws as transitional justice mechanisms 
 
One of the rationales most frequently put forward in favour of memory laws is that such 
expressions offend, defame and marginalize the victim group; the laws are meant to protect 
their feelings of secure existence (which may be threatened by such expressions).10 This line 
of reasoning is often applied not only to victims’ relatives and survivors but to the group as a 
whole (as in ‘the Jewish community’), including later generations. The link between denial of 
grave crimes and defamation of victim groups can, in particular, be found in the idea that 
distorting the facts of such crimes is actually a means of accusing the victims of lying about 
what happened. Indeed, some Holocaust denial takes the vicious form of explicitly accusing 
eyewitnesses of being untrustworthy and merely out to obtain compensation.11  
Transitional justice mechanisms, including criminal trials and truth commissions, may 
play a role in bringing out this ‘truth’ (though some mechanisms are arguably more 
appropriate for this task than others). Not only can transitional justice create knowledge about 
the facts and circumstances of gross human rights violations, it can also help to turn 
knowledge into official acknowledgment of what happened: the knowledge becomes officially 
sanctioned and enters the public sphere.12 After a long stream of lies and denial, such truth-
telling can thus have intrinsic value. With acts so abhorrent that it is hard to believe they 
really happened and subjugated victim groups who have long experienced denial and disbelief 
                                               
8 IW Charny, ‘A classification of denials of the Holocaust and other genocides’, (2003) 1 Journal of genocide research) 11, 
14. 
9 Charny, A classification of denials (2003) 22-23. 
10 L Douglas, The memory of judgment: making law and history in the trials of the Holocaust, (New Haven, Yale University 
Press, 2001) 219; B Swart, ‘Denying Shoah’ in P Alldridge and CH Brants (eds), Personal autonomy, the private sphere and 
criminal law: a comparative study ( Oxford,Hart, 2001) 161. 
11 D Fraser, ‘“On the Internet, nobody knows you’re a Nazi”: some comparative legal aspects of Holocaust denial on the 
WWW’ in I Hare and J Weinstein (eds), Extreme speech and democracy (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009) 511. 
12 Cohen, States of denial (2001) 225 (referring to a speech by Thomas Nagel). 
of their accounts from other sectors of society, acknowledgment is crucial.13 Denial of such 
grave crimes can add insult to injury exactly because the victims are – again – not believed.  
 In this sense, memory laws are also transitional justice mechanisms, aimed at coming 
to terms with the legacy of gross human rights violations from the past. Law thus ‘becomes a 
space in which the collective memory is defined’.14 Truth-telling is not only vital for victims 
and their next of kin, but also for society as a whole to come to terms with its past. This is 
exemplified by the development of the ‘right to the truth’ in international law, which includes 
not only the right of victims/relatives to know the truth, but also implies a collective right for 
society.15 The Updated Set of principles for the protection and promotion of human rights 
through action to combat impunity (2005), as developed by independent expert Orentlicher on 
request of the UN Commission on Human Rights, specifically set forth a duty for the state to 
preserve memory:  
 
‘A people’s knowledge of the history of its oppression is part of its heritage and, as 
such, must be ensured by appropriate measures in fulfilment of the State’s duty to 
preserve archives and other evidence concerning violations of human rights and 
humanitarian law and to facilitate knowledge of those violations. Such measures shall 
be aimed at preserving the collective memory from extinction and, in particular, at 
guarding against the development of revisionist and negationist arguments.’16 
 
In the eyes of critics, memory laws are a means to lay down one truth and to distinguish this 
from falsehood: a way of fixing history. The argument then goes that such laws can silence 
scientific criticism of common historical interpretations. Especially when questions of 
interpretation of, and responsibility for, atrocities come to the fore, it is difficult after all to 
speak of ‘the’ historical truth that should be preserved. If transitional justice is viewed as a 
process whereby different views and interpretations about what happened are continuously 
debated and contested among different actors17, it becomes clear why a public sphere in which 
those different visions can be set forth and discussed is so vital. It is particularly the role of 
                                               
13 MU Walker, ‘Truth telling as reparations’, (2010) 4 Metaphilosophy 525, 536-537. 
14 Fronza, The punishment of negationism (2006) 611. 
15 Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1985-1986, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.68, Doc. 8 rev. 1, chapter 
V; IACtHR Moiwana Community v Suriname Series C no 124 (2005) par. 204; Updated Set of Principles for the protection 
and promotion of human rights through action to combat impunity, E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 (2005); Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Study on the right to the truth, E/CN.4/2006/91 (2006). 
16 Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat 
Impunity (2005) Principle 3, http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/alldocs. aspx?doc_id=10800. 
17 See C Brants, ‘Introduction’ in C Brants, A Hol and D Siegel (eds), Transitional justice. Images and memories (Aldershot, 
Ashgate, 2013) 1. 
the state in proclaiming such ‘truths’ that is regarded as problematic – the role of the 
authorities in ruling out certain narratives.  
However, there is also a different, more subtle version of the ‘truth v. falsehood’ 
rationale: memory laws may be means of confirming the sacral status of what happened – 
Holocaust denial laws form a clear example.18 In a way, they resemble blasphemy laws: 
denial of such acts is an expression that goes against everything society stands for – an attack 
on that which is regarded as sacred. Thus in some jurisdictions Holocaust denial is 
criminalized separately (or is the only form of genocide denial that is prohibited), because of 
'the very magnitude of the rupture that the Holocaust caused to liberal and Enlightenment 
sensibilities. In this regard, to deny the Holocaust is not simply to offend a single group or the 
historical record; it is to insult the very notions of meaning upon which the liberal concept of 
public discourse is predicated.’19 According to Margalit and Motzkin, the Holocaust has come 
to be viewed as a ‘negative myth of origin for the postwar world’, by which they mean that 
we have come to view it as ‘both a caesura that separates us from the pre-Holocaust past and 
as the point in time and place at which the world of our values has originated’, thus serving a 
mythic function in society.20 I will come back to this later. 
States may use various mechanisms to encourage opening up and confronting the past 
in the public sphere and to guard collective memory against extinction; but they also use 
transitional justice mechanisms to restrict debate about the past and close it to public scrutiny. 
Transitional justice has an important ‘forward-looking’ function in terms of reforming 
democratic institutions and reforming the larger societal structures that generated the conflict 
in the first place.21 This can include legislative changes in the field of civil and political rights, 
such as freedom of expression; but the sensitivities involved in – and states’ negative 
experiences with – freedoms such as speech, association and assembly may also lead to harsh 
restrictions to these freedoms as a way of achieving reconciliation and preventing future 
atrocities. See, for instance, the broad Rwandan laws on genocide denial and genocide 
ideology, which cover many types of challenges to the government’s ideas on the genocide 
and reconciliation. The country’s experience with hate speech before and during the genocide 
seems to have played a role in the way freedom of speech has come to be viewed afterwards. 
Opposition figure Victoire Ingabire, for instance, was convicted to fifteen years’ 
                                               
18 Douglas, The memory of judgment (2001) 220. 
19 Douglas, The memory of judgment (2001) 217. 
20 A Margalit and G Motzkin, ‘The uniqueness of the Holocaust’ (1996) 1 Philosophy & Public Affairs 65, 80. 
21 J Balint, ‘Dealing with international crimes: towards a conceptual model of accountability and justice’ in A Smeulers and 
R Haveman (eds), Supranational criminology: towards a criminology of international crimes (Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2008) 
311-334. 
imprisonment for – amongst other things – drawing attention to Hutu victims during a 
genocide memory ceremony.22  
 Memory laws can be means of disconnecting the old repressive regime from the 
modern regime – the current regime which has acknowledged the violence from the past, now 
protects that memory (for example, Holocaust denial laws in Germany). A state may thus 
attempt ‘to redeem its claims of legitimacy through acts of coerced remembering, in which the 
history of past crimes remains ever present and in which the law serves as the muscle of 
memory.’23 But this can also work the other way around, as with prosecutions for 
acknowledging the Armenian genocide in Turkey: sometimes, the ideologies (in this case the 
nationalist ideas) underpinning the state are closely connected to repression of the memory of 
past atrocities.  
 
 
ECtHR Perinçek v. Switzerland 
 
The ECtHR case of Perinçek v. Switzerland aptly illustrates many of the dilemmas involved 
in memory laws. Mr. Perinçek, doctor of law, is a Turkish national and leader of the Worker’s 
Party (now Patriotic Party) in Turkey. He had participated in various conferences in 
Switzerland, where he denied that the Ottoman Empire had perpetrated genocide against the 
Armenian people in 1915 and onwards. He called the Armenian genocide an ‘international 
lie’, but did not call into doubt that massacres and deportations had taken place against the 
Armenians: however, he stated that massacres were committed on both sides as part of a 
‘battle between peoples’ in which the Turks and the Kurds were defending its homeland 
against Armenians provoked to violence by imperialist powers. In Switzerland, Perinçek was 
criminally convicted for genocide denial (which is mentioned under the offence of racial 
discrimination; the provision in question is drafted broadly and does not mention any specific 
genocide).  
Both the ECtHR’s Chamber and its Grand Chamber judged that this conviction 
violated Perinçek’s freedom of expression (article 10 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights), though their reasoning focused on different aspects. They both pointed out that the 
aim of this conviction had been to protect the honour of the relatives of victims – a legitimate 
aim. However, for various reasons, the Court in both instances judged the measure 
                                               
22 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-25371874. 
23 Douglas, The memory of judgment (2001) 220. 
disproportionate to the aim pursued. According to the Grand Chamber, a balance needs to be 
achieved between the right to freedom of expression and the right to private life (art. 8 
ECHR), which includes ‘the rights of Armenians to respect for their and their ancestors’ 
dignity, including their right to respect for their identity constructed around the understanding 
that their community has suffered genocide’ (par. 227). First of all, Perinçek’s expressions 
concern a question of great interest to the general public – and as the Court consistently rules, 
the authorities’ freedom to prohibit expressions which fall within this sphere of public debate 
is rather small (except when the utterances contain calls for hatred or intolerance, which was 
not the case according to the Court).  
Second, the statements were made in the Swiss geographical context, where (in 
contrast to Turkey) the debate about this issue was not particularly tense or historically 
charged and had not led to serious friction between Turks and Armenians. The Grand 
Chamber held that the justification for criminalizing Holocaust denial – which the Court does 
find a proportionate restriction of freedom of expression - lies in the historical context: 
especially in states that have experienced the horrors themselves, Holocaust denial gets a 
dangerous connotation related to an antidemocratic ideology and to anti-Semitism. In contrast, 
there is not such a direct link between the Swiss state and the possible consequences denial of 
the Armenian genocide, the Court holds. Furthermore, the long lapse of time between the 
events and the expressions plays a role: as time goes on and there are fewer survivors, the 
need for legal regulation will lessen.  
Third, the Grand Chamber does not find the expressions so wounding to the dignity of 
the victims and survivors and their descendants as to require criminal law measures in 
Switzerland, since the statements were directed against imperialist powers rather than against 
Armenians. Finally24, the Swiss courts’ argumentation did not make it clear whether Perinçek 
was convicted for questioning the legal qualification of the events (by reference to Swiss and 
international law on genocide) or for disagreeing with the consensus within Swiss society 
about their characterization. The Swiss Federal Court – disagreeing with the court in second 
instance – had judged that there was a broad consensus in the community about the 
characterization of the 1915 events as genocide, which was reflected in political declarations 
and was formed on the basis of wide consensus among historians. As a result, it was irrelevant 
to delve into the appropriate legal classification of the events. Whereas the ECtHR’s Chamber 
                                               
24 The Grand Chamber also uses three further arguments, which are less relevant for the purposes of this contribution and will 
thus not be discussed: (a) the lack of consensus among Council of Europe states about the criminalization of such denials; (b) 
the lack of international legal obligations for Switzerland to prohibit such speech; and (c) the fact that a criminal conviction is 
a particularly serious type of interference with freedom of expression. 
felt forced to delve into the question of whether such general consensus in society indeed 
could have existed, the Grand Chamber refused to do so. It merely noted that if the Swiss 
courts meant to say that the prevailing views in Swiss society were the reference point, then 
the applicant’s conviction is particularly problematic because it would make it impossible for 
speakers to express ideas that diverge from those of the authorities or any sector of the 
population (par. 271). 
 The argumentation of the Court, while shedding light on various reasons for (and 
against) criminalizing denial of gross human rights violations, also reveals the problems 
behind those reasons. In the following parts, I will delve further into these arguments. 
 
 
Protecting the honour of victims: memory laws as hate speech or defamation 
 
A central reason in favour of prohibiting denial of human rights atrocities, which the Court 
readily accepts, is to protect the honour of the relatives of victims. This is an argument that is 
often heard in discussions about the criminalization of denial. Indeed, memory laws are often 
linked to – or immersed in – hate speech and group defamation laws: in Switzerland, denial of 
the Armenian genocide is also classified under the offence of ‘racial discrimination’.  
There are different versions of this argument (just as there are different rationales 
behind hate speech laws). First of all, denial of genocide can be viewed as a way of defaming 
the memory of deceased persons25 – an argument which the Grand Chamber accepts in 
principle (but which is eventually overruled by freedom of expression considerations). 
Second, there is the idea of denial as a means of rehabilitating the repressive regime 
and thus posing a threat for society in the future. In Stanton’s ‘eight stages of genocide’, 
denial of genocide is included as the final stage: ‘[d]enial is the eighth stage that always 
follows a genocide. It is among the surest indicators of further genocidal massacres.’26 Denial 
starts with the perpetrators themselves - concealing the evidence and inventing euphemistic 
terms for atrocities is an important tactic to commit genocide - and current denial is thus 
regarded as a continuation of the perpetrators' original tactics and thereby even as a 
continuation of the genocide itself.27 Holocaust denial, for instance, is often regarded as a 
                                               
25 Hennebel and Hochmann, Introduction (2011) xliv. 
26 GH Stanton, ‘The 8 stages of genocide’, 1998, www.genocidewatch.org/aboutgenocide/8stagesofgenocide.html. 
27 L Douglas, ‘From trying the perpetrator to trying the denier and back again. Some reflections’, in L Hennebel and T 
Hochmann (eds), Genocide denials and the law, (New York, Oxford University Press, 2011) 49. 
means of rehabilitating Hitler’s regime and image and as bringing back anti-Semitic politics.28 
Whereas this may be the intention of certain speakers, whether there is a real chance that such 
rehabilition will happen is another question - this risk probably lessens after a certain lapse of 
time. How strong should the causal link between negationist speech and potential oppression 
or violence in the present and future be in order to justify criminalizing such speech? Or, 
alternatively, if the speaker's intention to continue the perpetrators' goals can be proven, is this 
in itself a reason to prohibit the speech - notwithstanding the potential consequences? But if 
so, how to discern such an intention - is every expression of every type of denial 
automatically intended to continue a repressive regime?  
The assessment of the potential consequences of such expressions is dynamic, 
depending on the political, historical and social context – as the ECtHR’s Grand Chamber 
also clearly states. Yet the Court’s argument that denial is especially dangerous in societies 
where the atrocities were actually perpetrated (which the Court uses to argue why it does 
accept convictions for Holocaust denial in countries such as Germany, Austria and France) 
also brings up questions. First of all, as the dissenting judges Spielmann, Casadevall, Berro, 
De Gaetano, Sicilianos, Silvis and Kuris (par. 7) hold: what does this imply for the way 
European countries are to deal with denial of e.g. the Rwandan genocide? Secondly, with all 
present-day means of communication, coupled with the presence of diaspora communities 
from different sides, can the impact of an expression be confined to a certain state only? The 
Grand Chamber does take this into account, but argues that the strict proportionality test 
inherent in article 10 ECHR ‘requires a rational connection between the measures taken by 
the authorities and the aim that they sought to realise through these measures, in the sense that 
the measures were reasonably capable of producing the desired result’ (par. 246). Though it 
can be applauded that the Court strictly assesses whether speech can actually lead to certain 
consequences, it still leaves open the question how such a strict test would turn out if it were 
applied to Holocaust denial cases (up till now, the Court has not applied such a test in these 
cases).  
Can denial indeed cause a greater danger in the countries where the horrors happened, 
or is this assessment in itself highly contextual? As the argument goes, Holocaust denial can 
be a driver for anti-Semitism:29 deniers accuse the Jewish population of lying about the past, 
which may eventually lead (again) to hatred and even violence against them. Yet one might 
                                               
28 An argument also used by the ECtHR: ECtHR Garaudy v France (inadmissible), 24 June 2003, appl.no. 65831/01; ECtHR 
Witzsch v Germany (inadmissible), 13 December 2005, appl.no. 7485/03. 
29 Human Rights Committee, Faurisson v France, Comm.No. 550/1993, U.N.Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/550/1993 (1996). 
also expect people, even those with an inclination to support racist viewpoints, to turn their 
backs on these deniers because their viewpoints are so absurd – especially in those societies 
that have radically broken with their atrocious past and especially after a long lapse of time. 
This depends on how they frame their viewpoints, but also on the prevalence and form of anti-
Semitism in a particular society. In the West, Holocaust denial has long been practiced by 
individuals and small fringe groups in a loose network who draw on a standard ideological 
repertoire that are regarded as illegitimate by the greater part of the societies in which they 
operate.30 Nevertheless, more recently Holocaust denial has also been practiced by more 
powerful figures such as the former Iranian president Ahmadinejad. This already points to a 
more globalised phenomenon (with expressions going around the world through various types 
of media and being picked up by readers in other continents) – thus it cannot simply be stated 
that countries per definition have more to fear from denial on their own soil of their ‘own’ 
genocides. 
In cases of state-organized denial such as Turkey (in states that have not made this 
radical break), or in cases where denial is prevalent in broad sections of society, concerns 
about the actual effects of denial in the public sphere are more pertinent – but the role of the 
‘denier state’ in dealing with memory laws is, of course, also radically different.   
 A third version of the ‘defamation/hate speech’ argument is that the human dignity of 
survivors, victims’ relatives and/or group members must be protected - the idea is then to 
prevent direct psychological harm caused by the expressions. As was set out previously, such 
speech can be threatening to people who have directly experienced the atrocities. It is 
particularly painful because for them, the idea that the truth will finally come out after years 
of gross human rights violations is extremely important. The propaganda, euphemisms and 
lies of authoritarian regimes cause a strong need among the victims of such crimes to bring 
out the truth, however painful that may be.31 If victims are - again - not believed and face the 
burden of proof to convince the outside world of what happened to them, they will find it 
extremely hard to achieve closure.32 
 And yet this argument leads to a crucial issue: which groups to protect and for how 
long - only direct victims and their next of kin? Or perhaps the whole ethnic, religious, or 
other group that they belong to? In other words: how wide is the scope of this argument and 
for how long can it play a role? The Grand Chamber also delved into this issue, arguing that 
                                               
30 Cohen, States of denial (2001). 
31 M Osiel, Mass atrocity, collective memory, and the law (New Brunswick, N.J., Transaction Publishers, 1997) 269. 
32 S Garibian, ‘Taking denial seriously: genocide denial and freedom of speech in the French law’ (2008) 2 Cardozo Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 479. 
‘a distinction needs to be drawn between, on the one hand, the dignity of the deceased and 
surviving victims of the events of 1915 and the following years and, on the other, the dignity, 
including the identity, of present-day Armenians as their descendants’ (par. 155). It follows 
the Swiss courts in their finding that many of the descendants, especially those in the 
Armenian diaspora, construct their identity around the genocide. Denial laws may thus be 
means to protect this identity and thereby protect human dignity (though Perinçek’s 
expressions, according to the Grand Chamber, were not virulent enough to have a severe 
impact on the group’s identity and thus significantly damage their human dignity). 
The close relationship between memory laws and identity (as well as identity politics) 
can go in different directions through time. As people become further detached in time from 
the atrocities, it may sometimes become easier to acknowledge what happened in the past, as 
public sensitivities can fade away over generations. However, sensitivities may become even 
stronger over time – especially when a society has experienced a period of (even state-
imposed) amnesia and the legacy of certain atrocities has not been discussed in the public 
sphere.33 At the same time, maintaining control over official history and alternative accounts 
'becomes increasingly difficult after the passage of time.’34 As stated before, for the ECtHR 
this time element was a factor as well (though not necessarily decisive): the Court suggested 
that with so much time passed since 1915, the need for the law to prohibit expressions is less 
apparent, even though it is still a pressing issue for Armenians. In other case law regarding 
historical sensitivities, the ECtHR has also referred to the time factor in a similar manner – 
such as in Vajnai v. Hungary35, where a Hungarian demonstrator was convicted for wearing a 
red star. Besides the argument that the star merely symbolized lawful left-wing political 
movements instead of totalitarian groups, the Court noted that 
 
‘almost two decades have elapsed from Hungary’s transition to pluralism and the 
country has proved to be a stable democracy (...) there is no evidence to suggest that 
there is a real and present danger of any political movement or party restoring the 
Communist dictatorship (...) The Court (…) accepts that the display of a symbol which 
was ubiquitous during the reign of those regimes may create uneasiness amongst past 
                                               
33 See Natalia Maystorovich Chulio, ch 13 in this volume; see also W Veraart, ‘Redressing the past with an eye to the future: 
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Quarterly of Human Rights 45.  
34 RG Teitel, Transitional justice (New York, Oxford University Press, 2001) 105. 
35 ECtHR Vajnai v Hungary (2008) 50 EHRR 44. See also ECtHR Lehideux and Isorni v. France (Grand Chamber), Reports 
1998-VII (1998). 
victims and their relatives (...) It nevertheless considers that such sentiments, however 
understandable, cannot alone set the limits of freedom of expression (...).’36 
 
A similar argument came back in Lehideux and Isorni v. France, concerning an advertisement 
which justified the actions of Philippe Pétain (chief of state in the Vichy regime). The Court 
held that ‘even though remarks like those the applicants made are always likely to reopen the 
controversy and bring back memories of past sufferings, the lapse of time makes it 
inappropriate to deal with such remarks, forty years on, with the same severity as ten or 
twenty years previously. That forms part of the efforts that every country must make to debate 
its own history openly and dispassionately.’37  
The Court thus takes the view that, even though there may be strong sensitivities about 
a situation lying further in the past which may offend people, this cannot as such provide a 
reason to legally restrict debate about such issues. Again, however, it should be noted that in 
cases regarding real Holocaust denial (as opposed to Lehideux and Isorni’s justificatory 
expressions) the Court never mentions this argument; such denial invariably connotes an 
antidemocratic ideology and anti-Semitism, the Grand Chamber holds. States that have 
experienced such horrors may even have a ‘special moral responsibility to distance 
themselves from the mass atrocities that they have perpetrated or abetted by, among other 
things, outlawing their denial’ (par. 243).  
 
Accusing the victims of lying  
 
We have seen that denial of gross human rights violations is regarded as a means of defaming 
victim groups because they are thereby accused of lying about what happened, thus adding 
insult to injury. If a speaker explicitly adds this accusation to a denial claim, this could be a 
reason to speak of ‘aggravated denial’ which is particularly serious, because it also targets a 
group of people.38 The Perinçek case, however, shows that it is not always clear from an 
expression whether a speaker is actually accusing a group of lying. At first sight, it needs little 
imagination to see an accusation of lying in Perinçek’s qualification of the Armenian 
genocide as an ‘international lie’. For the partly dissenting judges Vučinić and Pinto de 
Albuquerque (to the Chamber’s judgment), these words contributed to the conclusion that Mr. 
                                               
36 Par. 49. 
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38 Hennebel and Hochmann, Introduction (2011). 
Perinçek must have had the intention to accuse ‘the victims and the world’ of falsifying 
history, of labelling the Armenians as the aggressors and thus justifying the genocidal politics 
of the Ottoman state: ‘Les expressions «mensonge international», «historische Lüge» et 
«Imperialistische Lüge» qu’il a employées (…) revenaient à traiter les victimes de menteurs’ 
(par. 25).39  
Yet when looking at the context of this expression, one may also conclude that 
Perinçek’s aim was merely to take a stance against what he regards as imperialistic tendencies 
– he virulently criticizes the ‘imperialistic’ actions by the West and Tsarist Russia against the 
Ottoman Empire in the past and links it to the alleged current attempts by the US and Europe 
to impose a certain view of history. The Grand Chamber thus concluded that Perinçek did not 
call for hatred or intolerance. 
It gets still more difficult when a speaker does not explicitly accuse anyone of lying 
but merely makes a ‘factual’ assertion (‘bare denial’).40 Holocaust deniers often imitate the 
conventions of normal historical scholars, building up extensive factual arguments with 
footnotes etcetera; as such, it becomes even more difficult to distinguish bad intentions while 
at the same time also guarding the freedom of ‘real’ historical research.41 
 Whether the speaker’s real aim was this malicious, can sometimes be assessed by 
reference to his or her other speeches and actions – thus, courts can try to assess this intention 
by looking very closely at the context and the position of the speaker. The Swiss courts in the 
Perinçek judgment inferred such dishonest motives from the fact that Perinçek identified 
himself with Talaat Pasha, architect of the Armenian genocide. The ECtHR’s Chamber took 
note of Perinçek's identification with Pasha, but judged rather legalistically that he was only 
convicted for genocide denial, not justification or relativisation of genocide (so the court did 
not have to deal with the question whether he had justified the atrocities). The Grand 
Chamber held that there was not enough evidence ‘that the applicant’s membership in the so-
called Talaat Pasha Committee was driven by a wish to vilify the Armenians and spread 
hatred for them rather than his desire to contest the idea that the events’ (par. 186). It may be 
questioned whether the Court would also use such arguments in the context of the Holocaust: 
what if a defendant would deny that these atrocities constituted genocide and meanwhile state 
that he identified himself with Hitler? 
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40 Khan, Holocaust denial and hate speech (2011). 
41 Douglas, The memory of judgment (2001) 235. 
 General consensus  
 
Some states restrict memory laws to a limited number of mass atrocities (e.g. those atrocities 
which have been perpetuated or supported by the state itself), so that the law still leaves open 
the debate about other historical events.42 In this regard, the argument could be made that 
certain historical occurrences have attained a special ‘sacral’ status, such as the Holocaust has 
in the West, thus marking a radical break in time. Yet the question of how the law can put 
certain ‘truths’ beyond contestation and not others gives rise to complex dilemmas, especially 
in cross-cultural contexts where different groups may regard different events as ‘sacral’ and 
may not share each other’s sensitivities. 
The Swiss courts in Perinçek’s case, noting that the wording of the Swiss law was not 
limited to denial of specific genocides, tried to solve this by pointing to the ‘general 
consensus’ that existed in society about the characterization of the Armenian atrocities as a 
genocide. According to the Swiss courts, it was not necessary for the purposes of this case 
that the Armenian genocide be recognised as a genocide by an international court or that 
expert witnesses be called upon for proof that it was a genocide; the Armenian genocide is a 
proven historical fact recognized by the Swiss legislature and there is a general consensus in 
society (especially within the academic community) about its legal characterization as 
genocide.  
 The use of the general consensus argument is understandable from the viewpoint that, 
without it, the courts in denial cases will run the risk of being asked to judge on the truth or 
falsity of the historical facts at issue. The trial against Holocaust denier Ernst Zundel in 
Canada shows how badly this can turn out: the criminal procedure gave the defendant the 
chance to contest the facts of the Holocaust – facts that were already long known – to the 
fullest, calling in witnesses and casting doubt on every little detail.43 Though the trial ‘seeks to 
reaffirm the shared memory that the negationism questions’44, it runs a risk of failing to do so 
because ‘the law ultimately will remain less interested in safeguarding history than in 
preserving the conditions of its own complex normativity and discursive neutrality.’45 Relying 
on criminal law to deal with genocide denial can thus 'contribut[e] to the erosion of the very 
boundary between truth and falsehood that the law has been asked to police.’46 To what extent 
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a criminal trial runs these risks is also dependent on the domestic legal context (e.g. 
adversarial versus inquisitorial systems).47 In Europe, lawmakers and courts have tried to 
solve this by treating the Holocaust as an undisputable fact about which so much consensus 
exists that proof in court is not required. However, in the present case this led the Swiss courts 
first to consider whether the Armenian genocide could also be viewed as such an indisputable 
fact – and to do this, in turn, they needed to assess whether an equal consensus exists. This 
was, according to the Swiss Federal Court, a question about the general characterization of the 
events – among the broad community, as reflected in political declarations, and as based on a 
wide academic consensus among historians. This is a different issue than the strictly legal 
characterization or the existence of international court rulings.48 As such, the courts in fact 
tried to refrain from writing history themselves (which they would have had to do if they 
would not have concluded that the Armenian genocide was an indisputable historical fact).49 
Yet in the ECtHR Chamber’s view, there was an important distinction between the 
Perinçek case and past ECtHR cases on Holocaust denial: in those cases, it was decisive that 
concrete historical facts were denied that had been clearly established by an international 
court.50 This argument was not followed by the Grand Chamber (par. 243), whose argument 
for distinguishing Holocaust denial from the present case focused on historical context. 
Indeed, the requirement of ‘clearly established historical facts’ may turn out to be unfair: the 
question whether gross human rights violations have been acknowledged as such by an 
international tribunal (or even brought to justice before an independent tribunal at all) is, after 
all, dependent on many factors that may be rather arbitrary and politically motivated - as 
becomes clear from the aftermath of the Armenian genocide itself. In any case, proving gross 
human rights violations in a criminal court is fraught with difficulties. Because of the 
incentives of parties in the trial and the confined legal categories, because of the selectivity in 
cases and the risks as regards the political dimension of the truth as set forth by international 
tribunals, one may ask whether it is a good idea at all to base the regulation of expressions 
after mass atrocity on the historical truth that comes out of such procedures.51 Of course, such 
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historical ‘truths’ may be revisited in later trials where debates may be reopened. Yet this 
would then mean that memory laws need the same fluidity, which brings with it much legal 
uncertainty and a further potential ‘chilling effect’ on freedom of speech. 
 This uncertainty, however, is even more pressing when one takes the general 
consensus in society as a starting point. When is there enough consensus in society and in 
politics about the correct interpretation of the past, and when is this based on a sufficient 
academic consensus? Also, the decision whether or not to support a political declaration to 
this end can itself be guided by political rather than truth motives, as the Swiss courts also 
stated. Moreover, the general consensus argument hides from view those atrocities that the 
greater part of society is not yet willing to face or that have not received equal attention for 
political reasons, as Belavusau argues: narratives that ‘were deprived of equal competition on 
the “free market of historiographies”’, such as atrocities of the winning parties to a conflict.52 
Indeed, memory laws leaving the narratives of groups of victims out while protecting others 
can convey the message that what happened to them is not worthy of acknowledgment. Also, 
in multiculturalized societies judges and lawmakers may not yet be well acquainted with the 
historical 'sacred spheres' of groups that do not belong to the majority, which can easily lead 
to misunderstandings. In that regard, the Grand Chamber is right to point out that the 
‘consensus in society’ requirement would be very problematic with regard to the freedom to 
express dissenting views.  
Should we then leave this all to the legislature – in the sense of accepting only those 
denial laws that refer to specific genocides as laid down in the text of the law (as suggested in 
the partly concurring and partly dissenting opinion by Judge Nussberger)? This will, however, 
lead to similar problems of minority voices and memories having a hard time being accepted.  
 
Facts and interpretation 
 
Setting certain mass atrocities beyond contestation seems to set clear, defined limits to speech. 
However, what to do when someone contests certain isolated facts, or contests the 
interpretation of or responsibility for these facts? Perinçek’s argument was that he only 
questioned the legal characterization of the Armenian atrocities as genocide, and did 
acknowledge the massacres and deportations as such. For the ECtHR’s Chamber, this made 
his case different from most of the Holocaust denial cases it has been confronted with, where 
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defendants denied the gas chambers and other facts that have been clearly established.53 The 
Grand Chamber noted that ‘it can hardly be said that by disputing the legal qualification of the 
events, the applicant cast the victims in a negative light, deprived them of their dignity, or 
diminished their humanity’ (par. 156), though it did accept that Perinçek actually did more 
than that – he also justified those acts in the name of self-defense (rather than merely denying 
their legal characterization). According to the Grand Chamber, however, he did not do so in a 
way that relativized their gravity or presented the acts as right. 
 What to think of this distinction between denial of the facts and disputing the legal 
characterization of these facts? Is Perinçek’s interpretive denial less serious than literal 
denial? We have seen that it is not merely knowledge, but particularly acknowledgment which 
is vital in transitional justice processes, and that concerns facts, interpretation and 
implications. This becomes very clear in the Perinçek case: for many, real acknowledgment of 
the Armenian atrocities is acknowledgment as genocide. However, going down the road of 
prohibiting all types of speech which call interpretations into question, raises more difficulties 
than criminalizing literal denial: judging on interpretive issues brings the courts even closer to 
mingling in academic freedom.54  
It is not always so easy to distinguish between literal, interpretive and implicatory 
denial. Depending on context, questioning the appropriate legal category may also be a covert 
way of making people doubt what happened. Interpretive differences can be very sensitive 
and may also be used in malicious ways that are actually meant to justify (implicatory denial) 
or trivialize the facts and rehabilitate the regime that caused them – take, for instance, 
revisionist arguments that juxtapose different crimes (such as the Rwandan ‘double genocide’ 
theory55). According to Charny, ‘[o]ne discerns a point where the hairsplitting clearly 
obscures the genocidal event as a reality and banishes moral outrage and sensitivity to the 
infamy of the event and its tragedy (…) These disputations and definitional controversies take 
on appearances of legitimate intellectual-scholarly differences when they are basically 
contrived gimmicks and manoeuvers, at times quite malicious, to get away with denying 
crimes of genocide.’56  
Yet trying to differentiate ‘malicious’ from ‘honest’ motives for engaging in such 
discussions is an arduous task for the authorities, as has been argued in the previous section. 
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An argument against punishing interpretive denial is that the use of such laws can lead to 
endless legal fights over the appropriate category to apply to a particular situation - especially 
over the concept of genocide which has increasingly gained a symbolic status as representing 
ultimate evil (and, in the eyes of some, bringing with it a duty for the international community 
to intervene by using force).57 In many ongoing debates about history, it is questionable 
whether such juridification - with opponents labelling each other as criminal deniers if they 
refuse to use the appropriate qualification - adds to society's coming to terms with its past.58 
Historical and legal interpretations change over time: new facts and previously 
silenced narratives come to the fore, which lead to other interpretations and competing 
visions. Indeed, every generation rewrites the past from its own perspective with new insights 
about who is (most) responsible and what should be the appropriate legal qualification of 
events. This process is indeed not necessarily innocent and may be used for malicious 
motives, sometimes even by powerful parties such as states themselves. However, memory 
laws can easily target expressions which are actually part of a normal process of re-
interpretation rather than malevolent distortions. The authorities may still regard such issues - 
for instance, about the responsibility of different actors in a conflict - as too sensitive to 
discuss and thus label them as 'malicious' - acting upon their own political interests in setting 
forth certain interpretations and silencing others. Therefore one may ask whether a potentially 
repressive instrument such as the criminal law is the right tool to separate less benign forms of 
historiography from free speech, and thus to regulate the way past atrocities are discussed in 





Criminal laws on acknowledgment and denial of gross human rights violations can be 
regarded as very particular transitional justice mechanisms, which can play a role in 
determining the scope of the public sphere within which the memory of such conflicts is 
discussed. State authorities may have different rationales for adopting memory laws, or for 
using them in particular ways. 
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Memory laws are strongly related to one of the core goals of transitional justice: 
‘truth-telling’ in the sense of turning knowledge into official acknowledgment of what 
happened. They aim to counter the widespread denial that tends to accompany gross human 
rights violations, in order protect the honour of victim groups and to safeguard collective 
memory within society as a whole. This does, however, bring up the question of which groups 
to protect and over how many generations (especially in situations where the generation that 
has effectively lived through the atrocities is no longer there). After a certain lapse of time, it 
can become more difficult to set limits to the public sphere whereas one may also expect the 
risks for public order (the risk that the repressive regime will be rehabilitated) to become 
smaller. Though peoples’ sensitivities about the past may sometimes heighten in later 
generations – especially as regards aspects of the past have been covered up before – the 
justification for restricting free discussion about the past arguably becomes weaker over time. 
Even though memory laws may serve ostensibly laudable goals, depending on their 
exact formulation they risk making the public sphere of contestation over the past so small 
that ‘coming to terms with the past’ in turn leads to repression of basic freedoms. Indeed, 
when the ‘sacred sphere’ covered by memory laws is large, the public sphere thereby shrinks 
and spaces for contestation and varying interpretations become so small that transitional 
justice may turn against itself. 
In the fluid public sphere of transitional justice, ‘truths’ are continuously contested and 
new interpretations come up. This process may also be used by people and groups with less 
benign motives who try to blur the boundary between truth and falsehood in order to defame 
victim groups and claim legitimacy for atrocious regimes. However, they often do so in 
sophisticated ways, such as by putting forward arguments relating to interpretations of 
historical events rather than clearly lying about facts. Trying to differentiate ‘malicious’ from 
‘honest’ motives for engaging in such discussions is an arduous task. Using a repressive 
instrument such as the criminal law to set limits to the public sphere, can lead to a situation 
where political interests in setting forth certain interpretations and silencing others seep 
through; especially when such laws extend to interpretive and implicatory denial. Criminal 
trials based on denial laws, depending on the type of procedural system, also run the risk of 
becoming vehicles in the hands of defendants to bring doubts about the past - even about facts 
that have long been established - into the public sphere (though they are actually meant as a 
tool of closing off such discussions). Indeed, the ECtHR’s judgment itself may have 
inadvertently cast such doubts about the Armenian genocide – in this respect it is interesting 
to note that the dissenting judges Spielmann, Casadevall, Berro, De Gaetano, Sicilianos, Silvis 
and Kuris felt the need to express ‘That the massacres and deportations suffered by the 
Armenian people constituted genocide is self-evident. The Armenian genocide is a clearly 
established historical fact.’ 
 
The Perinçek case makes it clear that the choice for putting certain atrocities beyond 
contestation and not others brings up complex dilemmas, especially in cross-cultural contexts 
where different groups may regard different events as ‘sacral’ and may not share each other’s 
sensitivities. The ECtHR, even with its elaborate argumentation in this case, has great 
difficulties to justify how its older case law on Holocaust denial can be reconciled with these 
new questions before it – and it is not difficult to predict what kinds of challenges the future 
will bring.  
The use of memory laws as a kind of ‘backstop’, as a means of safeguarding the 
‘truths’ set forth in other transitional justice mechanisms such as international criminal trials 
and truth commissions, also gives rise to dilemmas: the ‘truths’ set forth by these mechanisms 
may be incomplete or politicized. Memory laws that restrict the public sphere by taking into 
account the sensitivities of some groups but not others, can convey the message that what 
happened to the groups that have been ignored is not worthy of acknowledgment. The range 
of acknowledged narratives changes over time (new criminal trials cover new terrains, for 
example), but if memory laws follow such fluid transitional justice processes, that could 
create much legal uncertainty and have a further potential chilling effect on the public sphere 
where such narratives are discussed.  
These are some first thoughts about the potential of memory laws as transitional 
justice mechanisms; detailed empirical research (e.g. about the impact that criminal trials have 
on the way certain aspects of history are discussed and valued) is necessary in order to 
determine the real impact of such laws on the public sphere in which truth and memory of 
past conflicts are debated. For now, I conclude that because of all the challenges involved, the 
potential of memory laws to police the public sphere after mass atrocity is disputable. The 
challenges posed may turn out to be insurmountable problems, which the regulation of 
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